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Abstract—Federated learning (FL), as a manner of distributed
machine learning, is capable of significantly preserving clients’
private data from being exposed to external adversaries. Never-
theless, private information can still be divulged by analyzing on
the differences of uploaded parameters from clients, e.g., weights
trained in deep neural networks. In this paper, to effectively
prevent information leakage, we propose a novel framework
based on the concept of differential privacy (DP), in which
artificial noises are added to the parameters at the clients side
before aggregating, namely, noising before model aggregation
FL (NbAFL). First, we prove that the NbAFL can satisfy DP
under distinct protection levels by properly adapting different
variances of artificial noises. Then we develop a theoretical
convergence bound of the loss function of the trained FL model
in the NbAFL. Specifically, the theoretical bound reveals the
following three key properties: 1) There is a tradeoff between
the convergence performance and privacy protection levels, i.e.,
a better convergence performance leads to a lower protection
level; 2) Given a fixed privacy protection level, increasing the
number N of overall clients participating in FL can improve
the convergence performance; 3) There is an optimal number of
maximum aggregation times (communication rounds) in terms of
convergence performance for a given protection level. Further-
more, we propose a K-random scheduling strategy, where K
(1 < K < N ) clients are randomly selected from the N overall
clients to participate in each aggregation. We also develop the
corresponding convergence bound of the loss function in this case
and the K-random scheduling strategy can also retain the above
three properties. Moreover, we find that there is an optimal K
that achieves the best convergence performance at a fixed privacy
level. Evaluations demonstrate that our theoretical results are
consistent with simulations, thereby facilitating the designs on
various privacy-preserving FL algorithms with different tradeoff
requirements on convergence performance and privacy levels.
Index Terms—Federated learning, differential privacy, conver-
gence performance, information leakage, client selection
I. INTRODUCTION
With AlphaGo’s glorious success, it is expected that the
big data-driven artificial intelligence (AI) will soon be applied
in all aspects of our daily life, including medical care, food
and agriculture, intelligent transportation systems, etc. At the
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same time, the rapid proliferations of Internet of Things (IoTs)
call for data mining and learning securely and reliably in
distributed systems [1]–[3]. When integrating AI in a variety
of IoT applications, distributed machine learning (ML) are
remarkably effective for many data processing tasks by defin-
ing parameterized functions from inputs to outputs as com-
positions of basic building blocks [4], [5]. Federated learning
(FL), as a recent advance of distributed ML, was proposed, in
which data are acquired and processed locally at the clients
side, and then the updated ML parameters are transmitted
to a central server for aggregating, i.e., averaging on these
parameters [6]–[8]. Typically, clients in FL are distributed
devices such as sensors, wearable devices, or mobile phones.
The goal of FL is to fit a model generated by an empirical
risk minimization (ERM) objective. However, FL also poses
several key challenges, such as private information leakage,
expensive communication costs between servers and clients,
and device variability [9]–[14].
Generally, distributed stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is
adopted in FL for training ML models. In [15], [16], bounds
for FL convergence performance were developed based on
distributed SGD, with a one-step local update before global
aggregations. The work in [17] considered partially global
aggregations, where after each local update step, parameter
aggregation is performed over a non-empty subset of the
clients set. In order to analyze the convergence more effec-
tively, federated proximal (FedProx) was proposed [18] by
adding regularization on each local loss function. The work
in [19] obtained the convergence bound of SGD based FL
that incorporates non-independent-and-identically-distributed
(non-i.i.d.) data distributions among clients.
At the same time, with the ever increasing awareness of
data security of personal information, privacy preservation has
become a worldwide and significant issue, especially for the
big data applications and distributed learning systems. One
prominent advantage of FL is that it enables local training
without personal data exchange between the server and clients,
thereby protecting clients’ data from being eavesdropped by
hidden adversaries. Nevertheless, private information can still
be divulged to some extent from adversaries’ analyzing on the
differences of related parameters trained and uploaded by the
clients, e.g., weights trained in neural networks [20]–[22].
A natural approach to preventing information leakage is
to add artificial noises, known as differentially private (DP)
techniques [23], [24]. Existing works on DP based learning
algorithms include local DP (LDP) [25]–[27], DP based dis-
tributed SGD [28], [29] and DP meta learning [30]. In the
2LDP, each client perturbs its information locally and only
sends a randomized version to a server, thereby protecting
both the clients and server against private information leakage.
The work in [26] proposed solutions to building up a LDP-
compliant SGD, which powers a variety of important ML
tasks. The work in [27] considered the distribution estimation
at the server over uploaded data from clients while providing
protections on these data with LDP. The work in [28] improved
the computational efficiency of DP based SGD by tracking
detailed information of the privacy loss, and obtained accurate
estimates on the overall privacy loss. The work in [29]
proposed novel DP based SGD algorithms and analyzed their
performance bounds which are shown to be related to privacy
levels and the sizes of datasets. Also, the work in [30] focused
on the class of gradient-based parameter-transfer methods and
developed a DP based meta learning algorithm that not only
satisfies the privacy requirement but also retains provable
learning performance in convex settings.
More specifically, DP based FL approaches are usually
devoted to capturing the tradeoff between privacy and conver-
gence performance in the training process. The work in [31]
proposed a FL algorithm with the consideration on preserving
clients’ privacy. This algorithm can achieve a good training
performance at a given privacy level, especially when there
is a sufficiently large number of participating clients. The
work in [32] presented an alternative approach that utilizes
both DP and secure multiparty computation (SMC) to prevent
differential attacks. However, the above two works on DP-
based FL design have not taken into account the privacy pro-
tection during the parameter uploading stage, i.e., the clients’
private information can be potentially intercepted by hidden
adversaries when uploading the training results to the server.
Moreover, these two works only showed empirical results by
simulations, but lacked theoretical analysis on the FL system,
such as tradeoff between privacy, convergence performance,
and convergence rate. Up to now, the theoretical analysis
on convergence behavior of FL with privacy-preserving noise
perturbations has not yet been detailed in existing literatures,
which will be the major focus of our work in this paper.
In this paper, to effectively prevent information leakage, we
propose a novel framework based on the concept of differential
privacy (DP), in which each client perturbs its trained parame-
ters locally by purposely adding noises before uploading them
to the server for aggregation, namely, noising before model
aggregation FL (NbAFL). To the best of authors’ knowledge,
this is the first piece of work of its kind that theoretically
analyzes the convergence property of differentially private
FL algorithms. First, we prove that the proposed NbAFL
scheme satisfies the requirement of DP in terms of global
data under a certain noise perturbation level with Gaussian
noises by properly adapting their variances. Then, we develop
theoretically a convergence bound of the loss function of
the trained FL model in the NbAFL with artificial Gaussian
noises. Our developed bound reveals the following three key
properties: 1) There is a tradeoff between the convergence
performance and privacy protection levels, i.e., a better con-
vergence performance leads to a lower protection level; 2)
Increasing the number N of overall clients participating in
FL can improve the convergence performance, given a fixed
privacy protection level; 3) There is an optimal number of
maximum aggregation times in terms of convergence perfor-
mance for a given protection level. Furthermore, we propose a
K-random scheduling strategy, whereK (1 < K < N ) clients
are randomly selected from the N overall clients to partici-
pate in each aggregation. We also develop the corresponding
convergence bound of the loss function in this case. From
our analysis, the K-random scheduling strategy can retain
the above three properties. Also, we find that there exists
an optimal value of K that achieves the best convergence
performance at a fixed privacy level. Evaluations demonstrate
that our theoretical results are consistent with simulations.
Therefore, our analytical results are helpful for the design
on privacy-preserving FL architectures with different tradeoff
requirements on convergence performance and privacy levels.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we introduce backgrounds on FL, DP and a
conventional DP-based FL algorithm. In Section III, we detail
the proposed NbAFL and analyze the privacy performance
based on DP. In Section IV, we analyze the convergence bound
of NbAFL and reveal the relationship between privacy levels,
convergence performance, the number of clients, and the
number of global aggregations. In Section V, we propose the
K-random scheduling scheme and develop the convergence
bound. We show the analytical results and simulations in
Section VI. We conclude the paper in Section VII. A summary
of basic concepts and notations is provided in Tab. I.
Table I: Summary of Main Notations
M A randomized mechanism for DP
x, x′ Adjacent databases
ǫ, δ The parameters related to DP
Ci The i-th client
Di The database held by the owner Ci
D The database held by all the clients
| · | The cardinality of a set
N Total number of all clients
K The number of chosen clients (1 < K < N )
t The index of the t-th aggregation
T The number of aggregation times
w The vector of model parameters
F (w) Global loss function
Fi(w) Local loss function from the i-th client
µ A presetting constant of the proximal term
w
(t)
i
Local uploading parameters of the i-th client
w(0) Initial parameters of the global model
w
(t) Global parameters generated from all local parameters
at the t-th aggregation
v(t) Global parameters generated from K clients’ parameters
at the t-th aggregation
w
∗ True optimal model parameters that minimize F (w)
W˜ The set of all local parameters with pertubation
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we will present preliminaries and related
background knowledge on FL and DP. Also, we introduce a
conventional DP-based FL algorithm that will be discussed in
our following analysis as a benchmark.
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Figure 1: A FL training model with hidden adversaries who can eavesdrop trained
parameters from both the clients and the server.
A. Federated Learning
Let us consider a general FL system consisting of one server
and N clients, as depicted in Fig. 1. Let Di denote the local
database held by the client Ci, where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. At the
server, the goal is to learn a model over data that resides at the
N associated clients. An active client, participating in the local
training, needs to find a vector w of an AI model to minimize
a certain loss function. Formally, the server aggregates the
weights sent from the N clients as
w =
N∑
i=1
piwi, (1)
where wi is the parameter vector trained at the i-th client, w
is the parameter vector after aggregating at the server, N is
the number of clients, pi =
|Di|
|D| ≥ 0 with
∑N
i=1 pi = 1, and
|D| =∑Ni=1 |Di| is the total size of all data samples. Such an
optimization problem can be formulated as
w
∗ = argmin
w
N∑
i=1
piFi(w), (2)
where Fi(·) is the local loss function of the i-th client.
Generally, the local loss function Fi(·) is given by local
empirical risks. The training process of such a FL system
usually contains the following four steps:
• Step 1: Local training: All active clients locally compute
training gradients or parameters and send locally
trained ML parameters to the server;
• Step 2: Model aggregating: The server performs secure
aggregation over the uploaded parameters from N
clients without learning local information;
• Step 3: Parameters broadcasting: The server broadcasts
the aggregated parameters to the N clients;
• Step 4: Model updating: All clients update their respective
models with the aggregated parameters and test the
performance of the updated models.
In the FL process, the N clients with the same data structure
collaboratively learn a ML model with the help of a cloud
server. After a sufficient number of local training and update
exchanges between the server and its associated clients, the
solution to the optimization problem (2) is able to converge
to that of the global optimal learning model.
B. Threat Model
The server in this paper is assumed to be honest. However,
there are external adversaries targeting at clients’ private
information. Although the individual dataset Di of the i-
th client is kept locally in FL, the intermediate parameter
wi needs to be shared with the server, which may reveal
the clients’ private information as demonstrated by model
inversion attacks. For example, authors in [33] demonstrated
a model-inversion attack that recovers images from a facial
recognition system. In addition, the privacy leakage can also
happen in the broadcasting (through downlink channels) phase
by analyzing the global parameter w.
We also assume that uplink channels are more secure than
downlink broadcasting channels, since clients can be assigned
to different channels (e.g., time slots, frequency bands) dy-
namically in each uploading time, while downlink channels
are broadcasting. Hence, we assume that there are at most L
(L ≤ T ) exposures of uploaded parameters from each client
in the uplink1 and T exposures of aggregated parameters in
the downlink, where T is the number of aggregation times.
C. Differential Privacy
(ǫ, δ)-DP provides a strong criterion for privacy preservation
of distributed data processing systems. Here, ǫ > 0 is the
distinguishable bound of all outputs on neighboring datasets
Di,D′i in a database, and δ represents the event that the ratio
of the probabilities for two adjacent datasets Di,D′i cannot be
bounded by eǫ after adding a privacy preserving mechanism.
With an arbitrarily given δ, a privacy preserving mechanism
with a larger ǫ gives a clearer distinguishability of neighboring
datasets and hence a higher risk of privacy violation. Now, we
will formally define DP as follows.
Definition 1: ((ǫ, δ)-DP [23]): A randomized mechanismM :
X → R with domain X and range R satisfies (ǫ, δ)-DP, if for
all measurable sets S ⊆ R and for any two adjacent databases
Di,D′i ∈ X ,
Pr[M(Di) ∈ S] ≤ eǫPr[M(D′i) ∈ S] + δ. (3)
For numerical data, a Gaussian mechanism defined in [23]
can be used to guarantee (ǫ, δ)-DP. According to [23], we
present the following DP mechanism by adding artificial
Gaussian noises.
In order to ensure that the given noise distribution n ∼
N (0, σ2) preserves (ǫ, δ)-DP, where N represents the Gaus-
sian distribution, we choose noise scale σ ≥ c∆s/ǫ and the
constant c ≥ √2 ln(1.25/δ) for ǫ ∈ (0, 1). In this result,
n is the value of an additive noise sample for a data in
the dateset, ∆s is the sensitivity of the function s given
by ∆s = maxDi,D′i ‖s(Di)− s(D′i)‖, and s is a real-valued
function.
1Here we assume that the adversary cannot know where the parameters
come from.
4Considering the above DP mechanism, choosing an appro-
priate level of noise remains a significant research problem,
which will affect the privacy guarantee of clients and the
convergence rate of the FL process.
III. FEDERATED LEARNING WITH DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In this section, we first introduce the concept of global
DP and analyze the DP performance in the context of FL.
Then we propose the NbAFL scheme that can satisfy the DP
requirement by adding proper noisy perturbations at both the
clients and the server.
A. Global Differential Privacy
Here, we define a global (ǫ, δ)-DP requirement for both
uplink and downlink channels. From the uplink perspective,
using a clipping technique, we can ensure that ‖wi‖ ≤ C,
wherewi denotes training parameters from the i-th client with-
out perturbation and C is a clipping threshold for bounding
wi. We assume that the batch size in the local training is
equal to the number of training samples and then define local
training process in the i-th client by
sDiU , wi = argmin
w
Fi(w,Di)
=
1
|Di|
|Di|∑
j=1
argmin
w
Fi(w,Di,j), (4)
where Di is the i-th client’s database and Di,j is the j-th
sample in Di. Thus, the sensitivity of sDiU can be expressed as
∆sDiU = maxDi,D′i
‖sDiU − sD
′
i
U ‖
= max
Di,D′i
∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1|Di|
|Di|∑
j=1
argmin
w
Fi(w,Di,j)
− 1|D′i|
|D′
i
|∑
j=1
argmin
w
Fi(w,D′i,j)
∥∥∥∥∥∥ = 2C|Di| , (5)
where D′i is an adjacent dataset to Di which has the same size
but only differ by one sample, and D′i,j is the j-th sample in
D′i. From the above result, a global sensitivity in the uplink
channel can be defined by
∆sU , max
{
∆sDiU
}
, ∀i. (6)
To achieve a small global sensitivity, the ideal condition is
that all the clients use sufficient local datasets for training.
Hence, we define the minimum size of the local datasets by
m and then obtain ∆sU =
2C
m . To ensure (ǫ, δ)-DP for each
client in the uplink in one exposure, we set the noise scale,
represented by the standard deviation of the additive Gaussian
noise, as σU = c∆sU/ǫ. Considering L exposures of local
parameters, we need to set σU = cL∆sU/ǫ due to the linear
relation between ǫ and σU in the Gaussian mechanism.
From the downlink perspective, the aggregation operation
for Di can be expressed as
sDiD , w = p1w1 + . . . + piwi + . . . + pNwN , (7)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ N and w is the aggregated parameters at the
server to be broadcast to the clients. Regarding the sensitivity
of sDiD , i.e., ∆s
Di
D , we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Sensitivity after the aggregation operation):
In FL training process, the sensitivity for Di after the
aggregation operation sDiD is given by
∆sDiD =
2Cpi
m
. (8)
Proof 1: See Appendix A.
Algorithm 1: Noising before Aggregation FL
Data: T , w(0), µ, ǫ and δ
1 Initialization: t = 1 and w
(0)
i = w
(0), ∀i
2 while t ≤ T do
3 Local training process:
4 while Ci ∈ {C1, C2, . . . , CN} do
5 Update the local parameters w
(t)
i as
6
w
(t)
i = argmin
wi
(
Fi(wi) +
µ
2 ‖wi −w(t−1)‖2
)
7 Clip the local parameters
w
(t)
i = w
(t)
i /max
(
1,
‖w(t)
i
‖
C
)
8 Add noise and upload parameters
w˜
(t)
i = w
(t)
i + n
(t)
i
9 Model aggregating process:
10 Update the global parameters w(t) as
11 w
(t) =
N∑
i=1
piw˜
(t)
i
12 The server broadcasts global noised parameters
13 w˜
(t) = w(t) + n
(t)
D
14 Local testing process:
15 while Ci ∈ {C1, C2, . . . , CN} do
16 Test the aggregating parameters w˜(t) using local
dataset
17 t← t+ 1
Result: w˜(T )
Remark 1: From the above lemma, to achieve a small global
sensitivity in the downlin channel which is defined by
∆sD , max
{
∆sDiD
}
= max
{
2Cpi
m
}
, ∀i, (9)
the ideal condition is that all the clients should use the same
size of local datasets for training, i.e., pi = 1/N .
From the above remark, when setting pi = 1/N , ∀i, we
can obtain the optimal value of the sensitivity ∆sD. So here
we should add noise at the client side first and then decide
whether or not to add noises at server to satisfy the (ǫ, δ)-DP
criterion in the downlink channel.
Theorem 1 (DP guarantee for downlink channels): To en-
sure (ǫ, δ)-DP in the downlink channels with T aggregations,
5the standard deviation of Gaussian noises nD that are added
to the aggregated parameter w by the server can be given as
σD =
{
2cC
√
T 2−L2N
mNǫ T > L
√
N,
0 T ≤ L√N. (10)
Proof 2: See Appendix B.
Theorem 1 shows that to satisfy a (ǫ, δ)-DP requirement
for the downlink channels, additional noises nD need to be
added by the server. With a certain L, the standard deviation
of additional noises is depending on the relationship between
the number of aggregation times T and the number of clients
N . The intuition is that a larger T can lead to a higher chance
of information leakage, while a larger number of clients is
helpful for hiding their private information. This theorem also
provides the variance value of the noises that should be added
to the aggregated parameters. Based on the above results, we
propose the following NbAFL algorithm.
B. Proposed NbAFL
Algorithm 1 outlines our NbAFL for training an effective
model with a global (ǫ, δ)-DP requirement. We denote by µ
the presetting constant of the proximal term and by w(0) the
initiate global parameter. At the beginning of this algorithm,
the server broadcasts the required privacy level parameters
(ǫ, δ) are set and the initiate global parameter w(0) are sent to
clients. In the t-th aggregation, N active clients respectively
train the parameters by using local databases with preset
termination conditions. After completing the local training,
the i-th client, ∀i, will add noises to the trained parameters
w
(t)
i , and upload the noised parameters w˜
(t)
i to the server for
aggregation.
Then the server update the global parameters w(t) by
aggregating the local parameters integrated with different
weights. Additive noises n
(t)
D are added to this w
(t) according
to Theorem 1 before being broadcast to the clients. Based on
the received global parameters w˜(t), each client will estimate
the accuracy by using local testing databases and start the next
round of training process based on these received parameters.
The FL process completes after the aggregation time reaches
a preset number T and the algorithm returns w˜(T ).
Now, let us focus on the privacy preservation performance
of the NbAFL. First, the set of all local parameters, denoted
by W˜ = {w˜1, . . . , w˜N}, are received by the server. Owing to
the local perturbations in the NbAFL, it will be difficult for
malicious adversaries to infer the information at the i-client
from its uploaded parameters w˜i. After the model aggregation,
the aggregated parameters w will be sent back to clients via
broadcast channels. This poses threats on clients’s privacy as
potential adversaries may reveal sensitive information about
individual clients from w. In this case, additive noises may be
posed to w based on Theorem 1.
IV. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS ON NBAFL
In this section, we are ready to analyze the convergence
performance of the proposed NbAFL. First, we analyze the
expected increment of adjacent aggregations in the loss func-
tion with Gaussian noises. Then, we focus on deriving the
convergence property under the global (ǫ, δ)-DP requirement.
For the convenience of the analysis, we make the following
assumptions on the loss function and network parameters.
Assumption 1: We make assumptions on the global loss
function F (·) defined by F (·) , ∑Ni piFi(·), and the i-th
local loss function Fi(·) as follows:
1) Fi(w) is convex;
2) Fi(w) satisfies the Polyak-Lojasiewicz condition with
the positive parameter l, which implies that F (w) −
F (w∗) ≤ 12l‖∇F (w)‖2, wherew∗ is the optimal result;
3) F (w(0))− F (w∗) = Θ;
4) Fi(w) is β-Lipschitz, i.e., ‖Fi(w)− Fi(w′)‖ ≤ β‖w−
w
′‖, for any w, w′;
5) Fi(w) is ρ-Lipschitz smooth, i.e., ‖∇Fi(w) −
∇Fi(w′)‖ ≤ ρ‖w −w′‖, for any w, w′, where ρ is a
constant determined by the practical loss function;
6) For any i and w, ‖∇Fi(w) −∇F (w)‖ ≤ εi, where εi
is the divergence metric.
Similar to the gradient divergence, the divergence metric εi
is the metric to capture the divergence between the gradients
of the local loss functions and that of the aggregated loss
function, which is essential for analyzing SGD. The divergence
is related to how the data is distributed at different nodes.
Using Assumption 1, we then have the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (B-dissimilarity of various clients): For a given
ML parameter w, there exists B satisfying
E
{‖∇Fi(w)‖2} ≤ ‖∇F (w)‖2B2, ∀i. (11)
Proof 3: See Appendix C.
Lemma 2 comes from the assumption of the divergence
metric and demonstrates the statistical heterogeneity of all
clients. As mentioned earlier, the values of ρ and B(w)
are determined by the specific global loss function F (w)
in practice and the training parameters w. With the above
preparation, we are now ready to analyze the convergence
property of NbAFL. First, we present the following lemma
to derive an expected increment bound on the loss function
during each iteration of parameters with artificial noises.
Lemma 3 (Expected increment in the loss function):
After receiving updates, from the t-th to the (t + 1)-th
aggregation, the expected difference in the loss function can
be upper-bounded by
E{F (w˜(t+1))− F (w˜(t))} ≤ λ2E{‖∇F (w˜(t))‖2}
+ λ1E{‖n(t+1)‖‖∇F (w˜(t))‖}+ λ0E{‖n(t+1)‖2}, (12)
where
λ0 =
ρ
2
, λ1 =
1
µ
+
ρB
µ
, (13)
λ2 = − 1
µ
+
ρB
µ2
+
ρB2
2µ2
, (14)
6and n(t) are the equivalent noises imposed on the parameters
after the t-th aggregation, given by
n
(t) =
N∑
i=1
pin
(t)
i + n
(t)
D . (15)
Proof 4: See Appendix D.
In this lemma, the value of an additive noise sample n
in vector n(t) satisfies the following Gaussian distribution
n ∼ N (0, σ2A). Also, we can obtain σA =
√
σ2D + σ
2
U/N
from Section III. From the right hand side (RHS) of the above
inequality, we can see that it is crucial to select a proper
proximal term µ to achieve a low upper-bound. It is clear
that artificial noises with a large σA may improve the DP
performance in terms privacy protection. However, from the
RHS of (12), a large σA may enlarge the expected difference
of the loss function between two consecutive aggregations,
leading to a deterioration of convergence performance.
Furthermore, to satisfy the global (ǫ, δ)-DP, by using The-
orem 1, we have
σA =
{
cT∆sD
ǫ T > L
√
N,
cL∆sU√
Nǫ
T ≤ L√N. (16)
Next, we will analyze the convergence property of NbAFL
with the (ǫ, δ)-DP requirement.
Theorem 2 (Convergence upper bound of the NbAFL):
With required protection level ǫ, the convergence upper bound
of Algorithm 1 after T aggregations is given by
E{F (w˜(T ))− F (w∗)} ≤
PTΘ+
(
κ1T
ǫ
+
κ0T
2
ǫ2
)(
1− PT ) , (17)
where
P = 1 + 2lλ2, κ1 =
λ1βc
m(1− P )
√
2
Nπ
(18)
and
κ0 =
λ0c
2
m2(1 − P )N . (19)
Proof 5: See Appendix D.
Theorem 2 reveals an important relationship between pri-
vacy and utility by taking into account the protection level
ǫ and the number of aggregation times T . As the number
of aggregation times T increases, the first term of the upper
bound decreases but the second term increases. Furthermore,
By viewing T as a continuous variable and by writing the
RHS of (17) as h(T ), we have
d2h(T )
d2T
=
(
Θ− κ1T
ǫ
− κ0T
2
ǫ2
)
PT ln2 P
− 2
(
κ1
ǫ
+
2κ0T
ǫ2
)
PT lnP +
2κ0
ǫ2
(
1− PT ) . (20)
It can be seen that the second term and third term of on the
RHS of (20) are always positive. When N and ǫ are set to
be large enough, we can see that κ1 and κ0 are small, and
thus the first term can also be positive. In this case, we have
d2h(T )/d2T > 0 and the upper bound is convex for T .
Remark 2: As can be seen from this theorem, expected gap
between the achieved loss function F (w˜(T )) and the minimum
one F (w∗) is a decreasing function of ǫ. By increasing ǫ,
i.e., relaxing the privacy protection level, the performance of
NbAFL algorithm will improve. This is reasonable because the
variance of artificial noises decreases, thereby improving the
convergence performance.
Remark 3: The number of clients N will also affect its
iterative convergence performance, i.e., a larger N would
achieve a better convergence performance. This is because
a lager N leads to a lower variance of the artificial noises.
Remark 4: There is an optimal number of maximum ag-
gregation times T in terms of convergence performance for
given ǫ and N . In more detail, a larger T may lead to a
higher variance of artificial noises, and thus pose a negative
impact on convergence performance. On the other hand, more
iterations can generally boost the convergence performance if
noises are not large enough. In this sense, there is a tradeoff
on choosing a proper T .
V. K -CLIENT RANDOM SCHEDULING POLICY
In this section, we consider the case where onlyK(K < N)
clients are selected to participate in the aggregation process,
namelly K-random scheduling.
We now discuss how to add artificial noises in the K-
random scheduling to satisfy a global (ǫ, δ)-DP. It is nature
that in the uplink channels, each of the K scheduled clients
should add noises with scale σU = cL∆sU/ǫ for achieving
(ǫ, δ)-DP. This is equivalent to the noise scale in the all-clients
selection case in Section III, since each client only considers
its own privacy for uplink channels in both cases. However, the
derivation of the noise scale in the downlink will be different
for the K-random scheduling. As an extension of Theorem 1,
we present the following lemma in the case of K-random
scheduling on how to obtain σD.
Lemma 4 (DP guarantee in K-random scheduling): In
the NbAFL algorithm with K-random scheduling, to satisfy
a global (ǫ, δ)-DP, and the standard deviation σD of additive
Gaussian noises for downlink channels should be set as
σD =
 2cC
√
T2
b2
−L2K
mKǫ T >
ǫ
γ ,
0 T ≤ ǫγ ,
(21)
where
b = −T
ǫ
ln
(
1− N
K
+
N
K
e
−ǫ
T
)
,
γ = − ln
(
1− K
N
+
K
N
e
−ǫ
L
√
K
)
.
(22)
Proof: See Appendix F.
Lemma 4 recalculates σD by considering the number of
chosen clients K . Generally, the number of clients N is fixed,
we thus focus on the effect of K . Based on the DP analysis
in Lemma 4, we can obtain the following theorem.
7Theorem 3 (Convergence under K-random scheduling):
With required protection level ǫ and the number of chosen
clients K , for any Θ > 0, the convergence upper bound after
T aggregation times is given by
E{F (v˜T )− F (w∗)} ≤ QTΘ
+
1−QT
1−Q
(
cα1β
−mK ln (1− NK + NK e− ǫT )
√
2
π
+
c2α0
m2K2 ln2
(
1− NK + NK e−
ǫ
T
)) .
(23)
where
Q = 1 +
2l
µ2
(
ρB2
2
+ ρB +
ρB2
K
+
2ρB2√
K
+
µB√
K
− µ
)
,
(24)
α0 =
2ρK
N
+ ρ, α1 = 1 +
2ρB
µ
+
2ρB
√
K
µN
, (25)
and
v˜
(T ) =
K∑
i=1
pi
(
w
(T )
i + n
(T )
i
)
+ n
(T )
D . (26)
Proof 6: See Appendix G.
The above theorem provides the convergence upper bound
between F (v˜T ) and F (w∗) under K-random scheduling.
Using K-random scheduling, we can obtain an important
relationship between privacy and utility by taking into account
the protection level ǫ, the number of aggregation times T and
the number of chosen clients K .
Remark 5: From the bound derived in Theorem 3, we
conclude that there is an optimal K in between 0 and N
that achieves the optimal convergence performance. That is,
by finding a proper K , the K-random scheduling policy is
superior to the one that all N clients participate in the FL
aggregations.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the proposed NbAFL by us-
ing multi-layer perception (MLP) and real-world federated
datasets. In order to characterize the convergence property of
NbAFL, we conduct experiments by varying the protection
levels of ǫ, the number of clients N , the number of maximum
aggregation times T and the number of chosen clients K .
We conduct experiments on the standard MNIST dataset
for handwritten digit recognition consisting of 60000 training
examples and 10000 testing examples [34]. Each example is
a 28 × 28 size gray-level image. Our baseline model uses a
a MLP network with a single hidden layer containing 256
hidden units. In this feed-forward neural network, we use a
ReLU units and softmax of 10 classes (corresponding to the 10
digits) with the cross-entropy loss function. For the optimizer
of networks, we set the learning rate to 0.002. The values of
ρ, β, l and B are determined by the specific loss function, and
we will use estimated values in our simulations [19].
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Figure 2: The comparison of training loss with various protection levels for 50 clients
using ǫ = 50, ǫ = 60 and ǫ = 100, respectively.
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Figure 3: The comparison of training accuracy with various protection levels for 50
clients using ǫ = 50, ǫ = 60 and ǫ = 100, respectively.
A. Performance Evaluation on Protection Levels
In Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, we choose various protection levels
ǫ = 50, ǫ = 60 and ǫ = 100 to show the results of the
loss function and testing accuracies in NbAFL. Furthermore,
we also include a non-private approach to compare with our
NbAFL. In this experiment, we set N = 50, T = 25 and
δ = 0.01, and compute the values of the loss function as a
function of the aggregation times T . As shown in Fig. 2, values
of the loss function in NbAFL are decreasing as we relax
the privacy guarantees (increasing ǫ). Meanwhile, in Fig. 3,
testing accuracies are also increasing as the privacy parameter
reduces. Such observation results are in line with Remark 2.
Considering the K-client random scheduling, in Fig. 4 and
Fig. 5, we investigate the performances with various protection
levels ǫ = 50, ǫ = 60 and ǫ = 100. For simulation parameters,
we set N = 50, K = 20, T = 25, and δ = 0.01. As shown
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Figure 4: The comparison of training loss with various privacy levels for 50 clients using
ǫ = 50, ǫ = 60 and ǫ = 100, respectively.
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Figure 5: The comparison of training accuracy with various privacy levels for 50 clients
using ǫ = 50, ǫ = 60 and ǫ = 100, respectively.
in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, the convergence performance under the
K-client random scheduling is improved with an increasing ǫ.
B. Impact of the number of clients N
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 compare the convergence performance of
NbAFL under required protection level ǫ = 60 and δ = 10−2
as a function of clients’ number, N . In this experiment, we
set N = 50, N = 60, N = 80 and N = 100. We notice
that the performance among different numbers of clients is
governed by Remark 3. This is because that more clients
not only provide larger global datasets for training, but also
bring down the of standard deviation additive noises due to
the aggregation.
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Figure 6: The value of the loss function with various numbers of clients under ǫ = 60
under NbAFL Algorithm with 50 clients.
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Figure 7: The value of the loss function with various numbers of clients under ǫ = 60
under NbAFL Algorithm with 50 clients.
C. Impact of the number of maximum aggregation times T
In Fig. 8, we show the theoretical upper bound of training
loss as a function of maximum aggregation times with various
privacy levels ǫ = 50, 60 and 100 under NbAFL algorithm.
Fig. 9 compares the theoretical upper bound using the dotted
line and experimental results using the solid line with ǫ = 60
and 100. Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 reveal that under a low privacy
level (a large ǫ), NbAFL gives a large improvement in terms
of the convergence performance. This observation is in line
with Remark 4, and the reason comes from the fact that a
lower privacy level decreases the standard deviation of additive
noises and the server can obtain better quality ML model
parameters from the clients. Fig. 8 also implies that an optimal
number of maximum aggregation times increases almost with
respect to the increasing ǫ.
Fig. 10 compares the normal NbAFL and K-random
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Figure 8: The convergence upper bounds with various privacy levels ǫ = 50, 60 and
100 under 50-clients’ NbAFL algorithm.
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Figure 9: The comparison of the loss function between experimental and theoretical
results with the various aggregation times under NbAFL Algorithm with 50 clients.
scheduling based NbAFL for a given protection level. In
Fig. 10, we plot the values of the loss function in NbAFL
with various numbers of maximum aggregation times. This
figure shows that the value of loss function is a convex
function of maximum aggregation times for a given protection
leavel under NbAFL algorithm, which validates Remark 4.
From Fig. 10, we can also see that for a given ǫ, K-random
scheduling based NbAFL algorithm has a better convergence
performance than the normalized NbAFL algorithm for a
larger T . This is because that K-random scheduling can bring
down the variance of artificial noises with little performance
loss.
D. Impact of the number of chosen clients K
In Fig. 11, we plot values of the loss function with various
numbers of chosen clients K under the random scheduling
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Figure 10: The value of the loss function with various privacy levels ǫ = 60 and ǫ = 80
under NbAFL Algorithm with 50 clients.
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Figure 11: The value of the loss function with various numbers of chosen clients under
ǫ = 50, 60, 100 under NbAFL Algorithm and non-private approach with 50 clients.
policy in NbAFL. The number of clients is N = 50, and
K clients are randomly chosen to participate in training
and aggregation in each iteration. In this experiment, we set
ǫ = 50, ǫ = 60, ǫ = 80 and δ = 0.01. Meanwhile, we
also exhibit the performance of the non-private approach with
various numbers of chosen clients K . Note that an optimal K
which further improves the convergence performance exists for
various protection levels, due to a trade-off between enhance
privacy protection and involving larger global training datasets
in each model updating round. This observation is in line
with Remark 5. The figure shows that in NbAFL, for a given
protection level ǫ, theK-random scheduling can obtain a better
tradeoff than the normal selection policy.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have focused on differential attacks in SGD
based FL. We first define a global (ǫ, δ)-DP requirement for
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both uplink and downlink channels, and develop variances of
artificial noises at clients and server sides. Then, we propose
a novel framework based on the concept of global (ǫ, δ)-
DP, named NbAFL. We develop theoretically a convergence
bound of the loss function of the trained FL model in the
NbAFL. From theoretical convergence bounds, we obatin the
following results: 1) There is a tradeoff between the conver-
gence performance and privacy protection levels, i.e., a better
convergence performance leads to a lower protection level;
2) Increasing the number N of overall clients participating
in FL can improve the convergence performance, given a
fixed privacy protection level; 3) There is an optimal num-
ber of maximum aggregation times in terms of convergence
performance for a given protection level. Furthermore, we
propose a K-random scheduling strategy and also develop
the corresponding convergence bound of the loss function in
this case. In addition to above three properties. we find that
there exists an optimal value of K that achieves the best
convergence performance at a fixed privacy level. Extensive
simulation results confirm the correctness of our analysis.
Therefore, our analytical results are helpful for the design
on privacy-preserving FL architectures with different tradeoff
requirements on convergence performance and privacy levels.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
From the downlink perspective, for all Di and D′i which
differ in a signal entry, the sensitivity can be expressed as
∆sDiD = maxDi,D′i
‖sDiD − sD
′
i
D ‖. (27)
Based on (4) and (7), we have
sDiD = p1w1(D1)+ . . .+piwi(Di)+ . . .+pNwN (DN ) (28)
and
s
D′
i
D = p1w1(D1)+ . . .+piwi(D′i)+ . . .+pNwN (DN ), (29)
Furthermore, the sensitivity can be given as
∆sDiD = maxDi,D′i
‖piwi(Di)− piwi(D′i)‖
pi maxDi,D′i
‖wi(Di)−wi(D′i)‖ = pi∆sDiU ≤
2Cpi
m
. (30)
Hence, we can set ∆sDiD =
2Cpi
m . This completes the proof.

APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
To ensure a global (ǫ, δ)-DP in the uplink channels, the
standard deviation of additive noises in client sides can be
set to σU = cL∆sU/ǫ due to the linear relation between ǫ
and σU with Gaussian mechanism, where ∆sU =
2C
m is the
sensitivity for the aggregation operation and m is the data size
of each client. We then set the sample in the i-th local noise
vector to a same distribution ni ∼ ϕ(n) (i.i.d for all i) because
each client is coincident with the same global (ǫ, δ)-DP. The
aggregation process with artificial noises added by clients can
be expressed as
w˜ =
N∑
i=1
pi (wi + ni) =
N∑
i=1
piwi +
N∑
i=1
pini. (31)
The distribution φN (n) of
∑N
i=1 pini can be expressed as
φN (n) =
N⊗
i=1
ϕi (n), (32)
where pini ∼ ϕi (n), and
⊗
is convolutional operation.
When we use Gaussian mechanism for ni with noise scale
σU, the distribution of pini is also Gaussian distribution. To
obtain a small sensitivity ∆sD, we set pi = 1/N . Furthermore,
the noise scale σU/
√
N of the Gaussian distribution φN (n)
can be calculated. To ensure a global (ǫ, δ)-DP in downlink
channels, we know the standard deviation of additive noises
can be set to σA = cT∆sD/ǫ, where ∆sD = 2C/mN . Hence,
we can obtain the standard deviation of additive noises at the
server as
σD =
√
σ2A −
σ2U
N
=
{
2cC
√
T 2−L2N
mNǫ T > L
√
N,
0 T ≤ L√N. (33)
Hence, Theorem 1 has been proved. 
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Due to Assumption 1, we have
E
{‖∇Fi(w) −∇F (w)‖2} ≤ E{ε2i } (34)
and
E
{‖∇Fi(w)−∇F (w)‖2}
= E
{‖∇Fi(w)‖2}− 2E{∇Fi(w)⊤}∇F (w)
+ ‖∇F (w)‖2 = E{‖∇Fi(w)‖2}− ‖∇F (w)‖2. (35)
Considering (34), (35) and ∇F (w) = E{∇Fi(w)}, we have
E
{‖∇Fi(w)‖2} ≤ ‖∇F (w)‖2 + E{ε2i }
= ‖∇F (w)‖2B(w)2. (36)
Note that when ‖∇F (w)‖2 6= 0, there exists
B(w) =
√
1 +
E{ε2i }
‖∇F (w)‖2 ≥ 1, (37)
which satisfies the equation. We can notice that a smaller value
of B(w) implies that the local loss functions are more locally
similar. When all the local loss functions are the same, then
B(w) = 1, for all w. Therefore, we can have
E
{‖∇Fi(w)‖2} ≤ ‖∇F (w)‖2B2, ∀i, (38)
where B is the upper bound of B(w). This completes the
proof. 
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Considering the aggregation process with artificial noises
added by clients and the server in the (t+ 1)-th aggregation,
we have
w˜
(t+1) =
N∑
i=1
piw
(t+1)
i + n
(t+1), (39)
where
n
(t) =
N∑
i=1
pin
(t)
i + n
(t)
D . (40)
Because Fi(·) is ρ-Lipschitz smooth, we know
Fi(w˜
(t+1)) ≤ Fi(w˜(t)) +∇Fi(w˜(t))⊤(w˜(t+1) − w˜(t))
+
ρ
2
‖w˜(t+1) − w˜(t)‖2, (41)
for all w˜(t+1), w˜(t). Combining F (w˜(t)) = E{Fi(w˜(t))} and
∇F (w˜(t)) = E{∇Fi(w˜(t))}, we have
E{F (w˜(t+1))−F (w˜(t))} ≤ E{∇F (w˜(t))⊤(w˜(t+1)−w˜(t))}
+
ρ
2
E{‖w˜(t+1) − w˜(t)‖2}. (42)
We define
J(w
(t+1)
i ; w˜
(t)) , Fi(w
(t+1)
i )+
µ
2
‖w(t+1)i −w˜(t)‖2. (43)
Then, we know
∇J(w(t+1)i ; w˜(t)) = ∇Fi(w(t+1)i )
+ µ
(
w
(t+1)
i − w˜(t)
)
(44)
and
w˜
(t+1) − w˜(t) =
N∑
i=1
(
w
(t+1)
i + n
(t+1)
i
)
+ n
(t+1)
D − w˜(t)
=
1
µ
E{∇J(w(t+1)i ; w˜(t))−∇Fi(w(t+1)i )} + n(t+1). (45)
Because Fi(·) is ρ-Lipschitz smooth, we can obtain
E{∇Fi(w(t+1)i )} ≤ E{∇Fi(w˜(t)) + ρ‖w(t+1)i − w˜(t)‖}
= ∇F (w˜(t)) + ρE{‖w(t+1)i − w˜(t)‖}. (46)
Now, let us bound ‖w(t+1)i − w˜(t)‖. We know
‖w(t+1)i − w˜(t)‖ ≤ ‖w(t+1)i − ŵ(t+1)i ‖+ ‖ŵ(t+1)i − w˜(t)‖,
(47)
where ŵ
(t+1)
i = argminw Ji(w; w˜
(t)). Let us define µ =
µ − ρ > 0, then we know Ji(w; w˜(t)) is µ-convexity. Based
on this, we can obtain
‖ŵ(t+1)i −w(t+1)i ‖ ≤
θ
µ
‖∇Fi(w˜(t))‖ (48)
and
‖ŵ(t+1)i − w˜(t)‖ ≤
1
µ
‖∇Fi(w˜(t))‖, (49)
where θ denotes a θ solution of minw Ji(w; w˜
(t)) [18]. Now,
we can use the inequality (48) and (49) to obtain
‖w(t+1)i − w˜(t)‖ ≤
1 + θ
µ
‖∇Fi(w˜(t))‖. (50)
Therefore,
‖w˜(t+1) − w˜(t)‖ ≤ ‖w(t+1) − w˜(t)‖+ ‖n(t+1)‖
≤ E{‖w(t+1)i − w˜(t)‖}+ ‖n(t+1)‖
≤ 1 + θ
µ
E{‖∇Fi(w˜(t))‖}+ ‖n(t+1)‖
≤ B(1 + θ)
µ
‖∇F (w˜(t))‖+ ‖n(t+1)‖.
(51)
Using (46) and (47), we know
‖E{∇Fi(w(t+1)i )} − ∇F (w˜(t))− E{∇J(w(t+1)i ; w˜(t))}‖
≤ ρE{‖w(t+1)i − w˜(t)‖}+ E{∇J(w(t+1)i ; w˜(t))}
≤ ρB(1 + θ)
µ
‖∇F (w˜(t))‖+Bθ‖∇F (w˜(t))‖.
(52)
Substituting (46), (51) and (52) into (42), we know
E{F (w˜(t+1))− F (w˜(t))}
≤ E
{
∇F (w˜(t))⊤
(
− 1
µ
∇F (w˜(t)) + 1
µ
n
(t+1)
+
(
ρB(1 + θ)
µµ
+
Bθ
µ
)
‖∇F (w˜(t))‖
)}
+
ρ
2
E
{[
B(1 + θ)
µ
‖∇F (w˜(t))‖ + ‖n(t+1)‖
]2}
. (53)
Then, using triangle inequation, we can obtain
E{F (w˜(t+1))− F (w˜(t))} ≤ λ2‖∇F (w˜(t))‖2
+ λ1E{‖n(t+1)‖}‖∇F (w˜(t))‖+ λ0E{‖n(t+1)‖2}.
(54)
where
λ2 = − 1
µ
+
B
µ
[
ρ(1 + θ)
µ
+ θ
]
+
ρB2(1 + θ)2
2µ2
, (55)
λ1 =
1
µ
+
ρB(1 + θ)
µ
andλ0 =
ρ
2
. (56)
In this convex case, where µ = µ, if θ = 0, all subproblems
are solved accurately. We know λ2 = − 1µ + ρBµ2 + ρB
2
2µ2 , λ1 =
1
µ +
ρB
µ and λ0 =
ρ
2 . This completes the proof. 
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We assume that F satisfies the Polyak-Lojasiewicz inequal-
ity [35] with positive parameter l, which implies that
E{F (w˜(t))− F (w∗)} ≤ 1
2l
‖∇F (w˜(t))‖2. (57)
Moreover, subtract E{F (w∗)} in both sides of (54), we know
E{F (w˜(t+1))− F (w∗)}
≤ E{F (w˜(t))− F (w∗)}+ λ2‖∇F (w˜(t))‖2
+ λ1E{‖n(t+1)‖}‖∇F (w˜(t))‖+ λ0E{‖n(t+1)‖2}. (58)
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Considering ‖∇F (w(t))‖ ≤ β and (57), we have
E{F (w˜(t+1))−F (w∗)} ≤ (1+2lλ2)E{F (w˜(t))−F (w∗)}
+ λ1βE{‖n(t+1)‖}+ λ0E{‖n(t+1)‖2}, (59)
where F (w∗) is the loss function corresponding to the optimal
parameters w∗. Considering the same and independent distri-
bution of additive noises, we define E{‖n(t)‖} = E{‖n‖}
and E{‖n(t)‖2} = E{‖n‖2}, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Applying (59)
recursively, we have
E{F (w˜(T ))−F (w∗)} ≤ (1+2lλ2)TE{F (w(0))−F (w∗)}
+
(
λ1βE{‖n‖}+ λ0E{‖n‖2}
) T−1∑
t=0
(1 + 2lλ2)
t
= (1 + 2lλ2)
T
E{F (w(0))− F (w∗)}
+
(
λ1βE{‖n‖}+ λ0E{‖n‖2}
) (1 + 2lλ2)T − 1
2lλ2
. (60)
If T ≤ L√N and then σD = 0, this case is special. Hence,
we will consider the condition that T > L
√
N . Based on (16),
we have σA = ∆sDTc/ǫ. Hence, we can obtain
E{‖n‖} = ∆sDTc
ǫ
√
2N
π
andE{‖n‖2} = ∆s
2
DT
2c2N
ǫ2
.
(61)
Substituting (100) into (60), setting ∆sD = 1/N and
F (w(0))− F (w∗) = Θ, we have
E{F (w˜(T ))− F (w∗)} ≤ (1 + 2lλ2)TΘ
+
(
λ1Tβc
ǫ
√
2
Nπ
+
λ0T
2c2
ǫ2N
)
(1 + 2lλ2)
T − 1
2lλ2
= PTΘ+
(
κ1T
ǫ
+
κ0T
2
ǫ2
)(
1− PT ) ,
(62)
where P = 1 + 2lλ2, κ1 =
λ1βc
m(P−1)
√
2
Nπ and κ0 =
λ0c
2
m2(P−1)N . This completes the proof. 
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
We define the sampling parameter q , K/N to represent
the probability of being selected by the server for each client
in an aggregation. Let M1:T denote (M1, . . . ,MT ) and
similarly let o1:T denote a sequence of outcomes (o1, . . . , oT ).
Considering a global (ǫ, δ)-DP in the downlinks channels,
we use σA to represent the standard deviation of aggregated
Gaussian noises. With neighboring datasets Di and D′i, we are
looking at∣∣∣∣ln Pr[M1:T (D′i,1:T ) = o1:T ]Pr[M1:T (Di,1:T ) = o1:T ]
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
i=1
ln
(1− q)e−
‖n‖2
2σ2
A + qe
− ‖n+∆sD‖2
2σ2
A
e
−‖n‖2
2σ2
A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
i=1
ln
(
1− q + qe−
2n∆sD+∆s
2
D
2σ2
A
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ln
T∏
i=1
(
1− q + qe−
2n∆sD+∆s
2
D
2σ2
A
)∣∣∣∣∣ .
(63)
This quantity is bounded by ǫ, we require∣∣∣∣ln Pr[M1:T (D′i,1:T ) = o1:T ]Pr[M1:T (Di,1:T ) = o1:T ]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ. (64)
Considering the independence of adding noises, we know
T ln
(
1− q + qe−
2n∆sD+‖∆sD‖2
2σ2
A
)
≥ −ǫ. (65)
We can obtain the result
n ≤ − σ
2
A
∆sD
ln
(
exp(− ǫT )
q
− 1
q
+ 1
)
− ∆sD
2
. (66)
We set
b = −T
ǫ
ln
(
exp(−ǫ/T )− 1
q
+ 1
)
. (67)
Hence,
ln
(
exp(−ǫ/T )− 1
q
+ 1
)
= −bǫ
T
. (68)
Note that ǫ and T should satisfy
ǫ < −T ln (1− q) or T > −ǫ
ln (1− q) . (69)
Then,
n ≤ σ
2
Abǫ
T∆sD
− ∆sD
2
. (70)
Using the tail bound Pr[n > η] ≤ σA√
2π
1
η e
−η2/2σ2A , we can
obtain
ln
(
η
σA
)
+
η2
2σ2A
> ln
(√
2
π
1
δ
)
. (71)
Let us set σA = c∆sDT/bǫ, if bǫ/T ∈ (0, 1), the inequa-
tion (71) can be solved as
c2 ≥ 2 ln
(
1.25
δ
)
. (72)
Meanwhile, ǫ and T should satisfy
ǫ < −T ln
(
1− q + q
e
)
or T >
−ǫ
ln
(
1− q + qe
) . (73)
If bǫ/T > 1, we can also obtain σA = c∆sDT/bǫ by adjusting
the value of c. The standard deviation of requiring noises is
given as
σA ≥ c∆sDT
bǫ
. (74)
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Hence, if Gaussian noises are added at the client sides, we can
obtain the additive noise scale in the server as
σD =
√(
c∆sDT
bǫ
)2
− c
2L2∆s2U
Kǫ2
=
 2cC
√
T2
b2
−L2K
mKǫ T > bL
√
K,
0 T ≤ bL√K.
(75)
Furthermore, considering (69), we can obtain
σD =
 2cC
√
T2
b2
−L2K
mKǫ T >
ǫ
γ ,
0 T ≤ ǫγ ,
(76)
where
γ = − ln
(
1− q + qe −ǫL√K
)
. (77)
This completes the proof. 
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Here we define
v
(t) =
K∑
i=1
piw
(t)
i , (78)
v˜
(t) =
K∑
i=1
pi
(
w
(t)
i + n
(t)
i
)
+ n
(t)
D (79)
and
n
(t+1) =
K∑
i=1
pin
(t+1)
i + n
(t)
D . (80)
which considers the aggregated parameters under K-random
scheduling. Because Fi(·) and F (·) are β-Lipschitz, we obtain
that
E{F (v˜(t+1))} − F (w(t+1)) ≤ β‖v˜(t+1) −w(t+1)‖. (81)
Because β is the Lipchitz continuity constant of function F ,
we have
β ≤ ‖∇F (v˜(t))‖+ ρ
(
‖w(t+1) − v˜(t)‖
+‖v(t+1) − v˜(t)‖
)
.
(82)
From (51), we know
‖w(t+1) − v˜(t)‖ ≤ B(1 + θ)
µ
‖∇F (v˜(t))‖. (83)
Then, we have
E{‖w(t+1) − v˜(t+1)‖2} = ‖w(t+1)‖2
− 2[w(t+1)]⊤E{v˜(t+1)}+ E{‖v˜(t+1)‖2}. (84)
Furthermore, we can obtain
E{v˜(t+1)} = 1(
N
K
)
(
N
K
)
N
K
N∑
i=1
piw
(t+1)
i + n
(t+1)
= E{w(t+1)i }+ n(t+1) = w(t+1) + n(t+1)
(85)
and
E{‖v˜(t+1)‖2} = E

∥∥∥∥∥
K∑
i=1
(
piw
(t+1)
i + pin
(t+1)
i
)∥∥∥∥∥
2

= E

∥∥∥∥∥
K∑
i=1
piw
(t+1)
i
∥∥∥∥∥
2
+ E

∥∥∥∥∥
K∑
i=1
pin
(t+1)
i
∥∥∥∥∥
2

+ 2E

[
K∑
i=1
piw
(t+1)
i
]⊤
n
(t+1)
 .
(86)
Due the independence between w
(t+1)
i and n
(t+1)
i , we know
E

∥∥∥∥∥
K∑
i=1
piw
(t+1)
i
∥∥∥∥∥
2
 = E
{
K∑
i=1
∥∥∥piw(t+1)i ∥∥∥2
}
. (87)
Note that we set pi = Di/
∑K
i=1Di = 1/K in K-random
scheduling in order to a small sensitivity ∆sD. We have
E

∥∥∥∥∥
K∑
i=1
piw
(t+1)
i
∥∥∥∥∥
2
 = 1NK
N∑
i=1
∥∥∥w(t+1)i ∥∥∥2
+
(K − 1)
NK(N − 1)
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
⋃
j 6=i
[
w
(t+1)
i
]⊤
w
(t+1)
j
≤ 1
K2
K∑
i=1
‖w(t+1)i ‖2 +
K − 1
K
‖w(t+1)‖2 (88)
and
E{‖v˜(t+1)‖2} ≤ 1
K2
K∑
i=1
‖w(t+1)i ‖2 +
K − 1
K
‖w(t+1)‖2
+ ‖n(t+1)‖2 + 2[w(t+1)]⊤n(t+1). (89)
Combining (84) and (89), we can obtain
E{‖w(t+1) − v˜(t+1)‖2}
≤ 1
K2
K∑
i=1
‖w(t+1)i ‖2 −
1
K
‖w(t+1)‖2 + ‖n(t+1)‖2
≤ 1
K2
K∑
i=1
‖w(t+1)i − v˜(t)‖2 + ‖n(t+1)‖2.
(90)
Using (50), we know
E{‖w(t+1) − v˜(t+1)‖2} ≤ ‖n(t+1)‖2+
B2(1 + θ)2
Kµ2
‖∇F (v˜(t))‖2. (91)
Moreover,
E{‖w(t+1) − v˜(t+1)‖} ≤ ‖n(t+1)‖
+
B(1 + θ)
µ
√
K
‖∇F (v˜t)‖. (92)
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Substituting (54), (82) and (92) into (81), setting θ = 0 and
µ = µ, we can obtain
E{F (v˜(t+1))} − F (v˜(t)) ≤ F (w(t+1))− F (v˜(t))(
‖∇F (v˜(t))‖+ 2ρ‖w(t+1) − v˜(t)‖
)
E‖w(t+1) − v˜(t+1)‖
+ ρE{‖w(t+1) − v˜(t+1)‖2} = α2‖∇F (v˜(t))‖2
+ α1‖n(t+1)‖‖∇F (v˜(t))‖+ α0‖n(t+1)‖2, (93)
where
α2 =
1
µ2
(
ρB2
2
+ ρB +
ρB2
K
+
2ρB2√
K
+
µB√
K
− µ
)
, (94)
α1 = 1 +
2ρB
µ
+
2ρB
√
K
µN
andα0 =
2ρK
N
+ ρ. (95)
In this case, we take expectation E{F (v˜(t+1)) − F (v˜(t))}
as follows,
E{F (v˜(t+1))− F (v˜(t))} ≤ α2‖∇F (v˜(t))‖2
+ α1E{‖n(t+1)‖}‖∇F (v˜(t))‖+ α0E{‖n(t+1)‖2}.
(96)
For Θ > 0 and f(v(0))− f(w∗) = Θ, we can obtain
E{F (v˜(t+1))− F (w∗)}
≤ E{F (v˜(t))− F (w∗)}+ α2‖∇F (v˜(t))‖2
+ α1βE{‖n(t+1)‖}+ α0E{‖n(t+1)‖2}. (97)
If we select the penalty parameter µ to make α2 < 0 and
using (57), we know
E{F (v˜(t+1))−F (w∗)} ≤ (1+2lα2)E{F (v˜(t))−F (w∗)}
+ α1βE{‖n(t+1)‖}+ α0E{‖n(t+1)‖2}. (98)
Considering independence of additive noises and applying (98)
recursively, we have
E{F (v˜(T ))−F (w∗)} ≤ (1+2lα2)TE{F (v(0))−F (w∗)}
+
1− (1 + 2lα2)T
2lα2
(
α1βE{‖n‖}+ α0E{‖n‖2}
)
= QTΘ +
1−QT
1−Q
(
α1βE{‖n‖}+ α0E{‖n‖2}
)
, (99)
where Q = 1+2lα2. Substituting (74) into (99), we can obtain
E{‖n‖} = ∆sDTc
bǫ
√
2N
π
,E{‖n‖2} = ∆s
2
DT
2c2N
b2ǫ2
(100)
and
E{F (v˜T )− F (w∗)} ≤ QTΘ
+
1−QT
1−Q
(
cα1β
−mK ln (1− NK + NK e− ǫT )
√
2
π
+
c2α0
m2K2 ln2
(
1− NK + NK e−
ǫ
T
)) .
(101)
This completes the proof. 
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